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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation,

)
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

)

Case No. 880075-CA

vs.

)

Appeal Priority 2

ARTIS BRENT BULLA,

)

Plaintiff/Respondent,

Defendant/Appellant.

)

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
AND APPELLATE AUTHORITY
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction after a
jury trial in the then Fifth Circuit Court (now Third
Circuit Court) for Salt Lake City, the Honorable Michael
Hutchings, Judge, presiding on the charges of running a red
light and false information to a police officer.

Authority

for this appeal is provided in Section 78-2-3, Utah Code
Annotated.
ISSUES PRESENTED
I:

Whether defendant Bulla established that his Fifth

Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated by
Salt Lake City Police Officers investigation subsequent to a
traffic violation.
II.

Whether there were any procedural errors requiring

reversal.
GOVERNING LAW
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
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77-7-15 - Authority of peace officer to stop
and question suspect -- grounds. A peace
officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe
he has committed or is in the act of
committing or is attempting to commit a
public offense and may demand his name,
address and an explanation of his actions.
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
77-35-19.

Rule 19 -- Instructions.

(a) At the close of the evidence or at such
earlier time as the court reasonably direct,
any party may file written request that the
court instruct the jury on the law as set
forth in the request. At the same time
copies of such requests shall be furnished to
the other parties. The court shall inform
counsel of its proposed action upon the
request; and it shall furnish counsel with a
copy of its proposed instructions, unless the
parties stipulate that such instructions may
be given orally, or otherwise waive this
requirement.
(b) Upon each written request so presented
and given, or refused, the court shall
endorse its decision and shall initial or
sign it. If part be given and part refused,
the court shall distinguish, showing by the
endorsement what part of the charge was given
and what part was refused.
(c) No party may assign as error any portion
of the charge or omission therefrom unless he
objects thereto before the jury is
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to
which he objected and the ground of his
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure
to object, error may be assigned to
instructions in order to avoid a manifest
injustice.
(d) The Court shall not comment
evidence in the case, and if the
to any of the evidence, it shall
jury that they are the exclusive
all questions of fact.

on the
court refers
instruct the
judges of
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(e) Arguments of the respective parties
shall be made after the court has instructed
the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law,
any limitation upon time for argument shall
be within, the discreti on of the court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
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Defendant Bulla's Brief fails to comply with Rule 24 of
the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals by not citing at all
to the record. Instead his entire brief is just a selfserving recitation of his own testimony. Of course, on
appeal, this Court must review the facts in the light most
favorable to supporting the jury's verdict. Green v. Tri-0Inc, 667 P. 2d 1320 (Utah ^ 9 ^ .
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westbound stopping only after seeing the police car.

(T.

54. )
2.

Officer Guest stopped the defendant and "pointed

out to him that he made a violation we needed to talk
2
about." (T. 54.)
Officer Guest also indicated the
defendant crossed in front of other southbound traffic after
Officer Guest had passed.
3.

(T. 70.)

Officer Guest asked the defendant for identifica-

tion and the defendant replied that he had none.

(T. 54, 1.

24-25. )
4.

When Officer Guest asked the defendant his last

name, the defendant looked around, paused, and said,
"Jones".

When asked his first name, he paused and said,

"Paul".

When asked his middle name, he paused and said,
3
"Arthur".
When asked his date of birth, the officer
recalled the defendant's response as 7-20-1950.

(T. 55, 1.

On cross-examination, defendant subsequently admitted the
red light violation. (T. 91.)
3
The defendant maintained in his testimony and brief that
his response was "John Paul Jones". This self-serving
recitation of the "facts" is not properly before this Court
in light of the jury verdict of guilty. Snyderville
Transport Co., Inc. v. Christiansen, 609 P.2d 939 (Utah
1980).
4
The defendant's booking sheet shows a DOB of 8-2-48. (R.
1.)
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5. Officer Guest asked the defendant for a social
security number and the defendant responded with a 278
prefix.

The Officer had never heard of such a number and

inquired where the defendant was living when this number was
issued.

Then the defendant "got all upset" and said he was

taking the Fifth Amendment.

Officer Guest stated " . . . you

have committed a traffic violation, and I'm going to give
you a ticket for it, I have to know who you are."

(T. 55,

1. 21. )
6.

Because the defendant was "very upset", Officer

Guest called for a backup.

Officer Cribbs arrived and

defendant continued in falsely identifying himself as
"Jones" (T. 55.) for a period of five minutes.

(T. 64, 1.

21. )
7.

When the defendant was frisked for officer

protection, a video store card was found in his pocket with
the name Artis Bulla.

(The defendant has never challenged

the validity of the pat-down search which produced the video
card. )
8.

When asked if his name was Artis Bulla, the

defendant responded yes and explained, " . . . well, I have
several warrants out for my arrest, and I didn't want you to
know who I was." Officer Guest verified that two warrants
were outstanding.

Guest then arrested the defendant for

running the red light, giving false information to a police
officer and the two outstanding warrants.

(T. 55-56.)
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9.

The defendant admitted at trial to using a false

name and also to making up a phony Social Security number.
(T.

90.)
10.

Upon the City's close of its case in chief, the

defendant moved to dismiss based on an alleged violation of
his Fifth Amendment rights.
denied by the court.

(T. 76-82.)

This motion was

Based on the evidence the Court ruled

that the defendant was not in a custodial interrogation
situation, or a post-arrest situation and was therefore not
required to have been given his Miranda rights prior to
making his false statements.

(T. 83.)

The defendant argued

his Fifth Amendment privilege to the jury in his closing
statement.
11.

(T. 107-110.)

At no point did the defendant object to the

instruction which he now raises before the Court of Appeals.
(R. 18-32, Instruction 2.)
12.

At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a

verdict of guilty on the charges of running the red light
and of providing false information to a police officer.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
(1)

The Fifth Amendment "Miranda" rights against self-

incrimination which defendant relies on are inapposite given
the facts of this case.

Miranda dealt with a post-arrest,

station house interrogation over a substantial period of
time.

The case before this Court deals with the brief stop

of an observed traffic violator with the questioning
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incident thereto specifically authorized by statute and case
law.
(2)

There was no error committed by the Court

concerning the credibility of the witnesses.

Nor were there

any procedural errors on the part of the trial court
preserved for this appeal.

The Instruction questioned on

appeal is simply stock and wrongly interpreted by the
defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT HIS
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION WAS
VIOLATED BY A POLICE OFFICER'S
INVESTIGATION INCIDENT TO A TRAFFIC
STOP.
This case is couched by the defendant in terms of a
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the
1956 Miranda case requiring custodial interrogation
warnings.

He suggests that, at the point when he was

stopped after having been observed running a red light, he
was under arrest, therefore Miranda warnings were required
and since they were not given, none of his subsequent false
statements (and the basis for his conviction) were
admissible.
A.

THE POLICE OFFICER'S STOP OF THE
DEFENDANT FOR A CRIME COMMITTED IN
HIS PLAIN VIEW WAS APPROPRIATE.

Neither statute nor case law support the defendantf s
contention.

Section 77-7-15, U.C.A., specifies that a peace
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officer may stop a person in a public place when the officer
has a reasonable suspicion to believe the person has
committed or is committing a crime.

Clearly defendant Bulla

was committing the red light violation in plain sight of
Officer Guest.

Section 77-7-15 goes on to give the peace

officer the right to demand the person's "name, address and
an explanation of his action."
No Utah case has been found challenging this statute
and similar statutes in other jurisdictions have not only
been upheld but have been considered a right extended to the
police under the common law.

See, United States v. Thomas,

250 F.Supp. 771 (1966).
Further,
The Fourth Amendment does not require a
policeman who lacks the precise level of
information necessary for probable cause to
arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and
allow a crime to occur or a criminal to
escape. On the contrary, [Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968)] recognizes that it may be the
essence of good police work to adopt an
intermediate response . . . .
A brief stop
of a suspicious individual, in order to
determine his identity or to maintain the
status quo momentarily while obtaining more
information, may be most reasonable in light
of the facts known to the officer at the
time.
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144 (1972).

(Emphasis

added.)
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B.

THE NON-CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION DID
NOT REQUIRE A MIRANDA WARNING.

The Utah Supreme Court has clarified the standards for
determining whether interrogation is custodial or
investigatory for purposes of the Miranda warning in Salt
Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (1983).

The Court

held that factors to be considered in making that
determination are:
1.

The site of interrogation;

2.

Whether the investigation focused on the accused;

3.

Whether objective indicia of arrest were present,

4.

The length and form of interrogation.

and;

The issue in earner involved field sobriety tests for
suspected drunk drivers.

The Court applied the four factor

test and found that administering the tests was
investigatory and not custodial.

Miranda warnings were

therefore not required:
. . . Applying that test to the instant case,
the field sobriety tests were requested and
taken on a public street. Moreover, no
indicia of arrest such as readied handcuffs,
locked doors or drawn guns were present when
the officer asked the defendant to perform
the field sobriety tests. Also, the length
of the performance of the tests was only
minutes, a relatively short period of time.
These factors do not suggest a custodial
setting. The environment may have been
authoritative but it certainly was not
coercive or compelling. It is true that the
investigation had focused on the accused.
However, that was true at the point of
initial observation; and, no one would argue
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that a Miranda warning was obligatory at that
point.
Carner, supra, at 1171.
This subject has been further addressed and clarified
by the Utah Supreme Court in stating that there are three
levels of police-citizen encounters:
(1) [A]n officer may approach a citizen at
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that
the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime; however the "detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop;" (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if
the officer has probable cause to believe an
offense has been committed or is being
committed.
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (quoting
United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984))
(citation omitted).

This Court reiterated quoted these

cases in the recent case of State v. Baird, 94 Utah Ad. Rep.
40 (Nov. 1988).
There is no question but that the public offense by the
defendant committed in plan view of the officer caused a
focus on the defendant.

However, the conversation between

Officer Guest and defendant Bulla, was as in earner,
conducted on the public street; likewise, there were no
handcuffs, locked doors or drawn guns; similarly Officer
Guest at one point indicated the defendant's repeated
representations of himself as "Jones" lasted for about five
minute.
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Based on these factors the trial judge's express
determination that this was a non-custodial stop is clearly
correct and Miranda warnings were not required,

(T. 84.)

It was not by any coercion by the officers, as the
defendant would like to portray it, but rather the
defendant's own choices which warranted the further
investigation and constituted the separate violation of
false information.
Further, the defendant could have chosen to remain
silent and avoided entirely the false information charge and
conviction.

(See, United States v. Bonanno, 180 F.Supp. 71,

86 n. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1960):
It must be borne in mind that the defendants
in this case had a constitutional right to
remain silent when questioned by police or
other investigatory agents or bodies, but
they chose not to do so. Had they chosen
such a course, they would have suffered no
penalty.
POINT II
THERE WERE NO PROCEDURAL ERRORS AT TRIAL
REQUIRING REVERSAL.
The defendant's second area of concern alleges various
irrelevant, theologically-based references as errors
requiring this Court to set aside the jury's findings of
guilt.

The defendant also raises for the first time on this

appeal, an objection to the following jury instruction:
It is the duty of the court to instruct you
in the law that applies to this case, and it
is your duty as jurors to follow the law as
the court states it to you, regardless of
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what you personally believe the law is or
ought to be. On the other hand, it is your
exclusive province to determine the facts in
this case, and to consider and weigh the
evidence for that purpose.
(R. 18-32, Instruction #2)
The defendant did not object to this instruction prior
to the jury being instructed as required under Rule 19, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure,
(c) No party may assign as error any portion
of the charge or omission therefrom unless he
objects thereto before the jury is
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the ground of his
objection.
Although this pro se defendant was graciously allowed
many indulgences by the trial court, he is bound by the same
procedural rules as is the City on appeal.
It is elementary that when a party does not
raise objections below when he had notice and
opportunity to object, he may not be heard to
complain for the first time on appeal. We
hold, therefore, that defendant waived all of
these defects, if any there were, by failing
to object below and we shall not further
consider them.
Huber v. Newman, 145 P.2d 780, 783.

The instruction

objection should appropriately be dismissed as waived.
Waiver, however, may not apply if the instruction works
a manifest injustice:
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object,
error may be assigned to instructions in
order to avoid a manifest injustice.
(Rule 19(c) U.R.C.P.)
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Even if the objection to the instruction was not waived
the instruction was appropriate.
instruction,
the jury."

Case law supports the

"Determination of facts is left exclusively to

Lemmon v. Denver and R.G.W.R.Co., 341 P.2d 215

(1944).
The defendant's argument seems to read the instruction
as requiring the jurors to come to a conclusion which was
illegal.

This is not a correct reading of the instruction.

The challenged instruction is merely the standard, or
"stock", instruction routinely given by trial courts in
accordance with subsection (d) of Rule 19 U.R.C.P. which
specifies the jury as the exclusive trier of fact (and by
corollary the court as the determinor of the applicable
law):
(d) The court shall not comment
evidence in the case, and if the
to any of the evidence, it shall
jury that they are the exclusive
all questions of fact.

on the
court refers
instruct the
judges of

CONCLUSION
This issue on this appeal is not about Fifth Amendment
rights and Miranda warnings. Neither came into play because
the interrogation was non-custodial.

The officer had a

statutory right and duty to stop and question the defendant
as he did for a violation the officer personally observed.
The defendant made his own choice to speak falsely and
compounded his problem.

Now he seeks to dress his behavior

in the armor of constitutional protection and avoid
responsibility for lying.
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That failing, the defendant then (untimely) seeks to
blame the judge, jury and trial procedures for his
conviction.

The stock instruction was appropriate and guilt

was adequately established by the witnesses.
The defendant's appeal should be dismissed in its
entirety.

7 IS+
Respectfully submitted this
1988.
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Assistant City Prosecutor
Attorney for Salt Lake City
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